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C u r r e n t  A f f a i r s  
In 2007, China emerged as the world leader in green-house gas emissions. Two years later, it undertook a fair-ly detailed discussion of the feasibility of imposing a car-
bon tax. Several prominent individuals in the administration,
especially in the finance and environmental protection min-
istries, as well as researchers, voiced opinions as to the need,
feasibility, and methods of implementing such a tax, in the
context of the run-up to the UN-sponsored climate change
conference in Copenhagen in December 2009.
Officials and intellectuals seemed to agree that action was
needed to reduce emissions. Behind this consensus lay inter-
national pressure. According to Tan Yao, member of an offi-
cial working group on global warming, China had to share
the burden of the fight against greenhouse gases in order to
be a “responsible member of the international community.“
Proactive introduction of a carbon tax would strengthen
Beijing’s hand in international negotiations on global warm-
ing and generally boost its credibility in the world arena.
A more immediate and pressing catalyst for initiating a car-
bon tax was the threat from Western countries to impose a
carbon tax at the border, endorsed in principle by the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). Xiong Jianfeng, Tan Yao, Fan
Gan, and Liu Chunyan all refer to this. However, while
from now on, importing countries will be able to impose dif-
ferentiated customs duties on products from countries with
weaker environmental constraints, “double taxation“ is disal-
lowed. This explains the lively discussion over a carbon tax:
by imposing its own tax, the People’s Republic of China
seeks to prevent its main trading partners from doing so and
using this pretext to apply breaks on Chinese exports. This
strategy is clearly deemed a “counter-attack“ against interna-
tional pressure; China should have first-strike capability in
order to prevail, in Fan Gan‘s words. Preoccupation with
environmental diplomacy has thus taken precedence over
environmental concerns as such.
This has led to the emergence of a consensus favouring the
introduction of a carbon tax, set at a low percentage and
reach at the outset and gradually increasing and expanding
in scope. The carbon  tax research team of the Research
Institute for Fiscal Science has stressed the need for a grad-
ual approach to extending the tax so that the Chinese eco-
nomic system can adjust to it without too much pain. The
team suggested fixing the initial level of the proposed tax at
10 yuan per tonne of carbon in 2012-2013, and increasing it
gradually in line with the country’s development. Journalist
Xiong Jianfeng has noted that the institute’s final report rec-
ommended introduction of the tax in 2010 at a level of 20
to 100 yuan per tonne, and doubling it by 2030. Xiong also
noted that in comparison, the price level for a tonne of CO2
on the Chinese carbon credits market as part of the Clean
Development Mechanism under the Kyoto protocol is
around six dollars. Another point of comparison: In the
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How the debate has fared
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European Union’s pollution rights market framework, a
tonne of carbon could fetch about 10 euros in early 2010.
Meanwhile, Sweden’s carbon tax is a high 27 euros.
Gradual introduction of a carbon tax in China should help
mitigate its negative effects, but its overall consequences are
as yet unclear. The Research Institute for Fiscal Science, as
Xiong has noted, appears optimistic on this score. Even at
the highest level suggested, namely 100 yuan a tonne, its
cost should not exceed 0.5 percent of gross national product
— and this without taking account of the beneficial effects of
such a tax, especially the diversion of energy sector invest-
ment towards emerging industries. Of course, much of the
apparently painless nature of this tax stems from the fact
that, as in Europe, it is meant to affect price structure and
not income; it makes carbon more expensive without making
economic agents poorer. The tax proceeds are thus meant to
be redistributed, one way or another. This necessitates a pol-
icy mix that is far from easy to put in place, as Tan Yao has
stressed. It could be used directly by the state as public
investment, as Xiong has noted, or it could be used to
reduce fiscal pressure on households and businesses through
a focus on the most disadvantaged, as Tan Yao and Fan
Gang have said.
However, sceptics such as Cai Fang and Sun Lijian stress
that while the experience of Western countries certainly
indicates that the consequences of introducing a carbon tax
can be relatively painless, or even positive, China’s situation
is quite different. China is still in an initial stage of develop-
ment, its industry and its economy still highly focused on
heavy industry and the energy sector. Furthermore, with
900 million employable people, China’s main worry has to
be job creation. As Xiong has said, quoting Cai, China’s
economic system, average educational level, and state of
available technologies preclude hopes of carbon taxation
leading to the creation of “green jobs“ in substantial num-
bers. In 2004-2007 alone, he says, emission reduction poli-
cies would have cost 370,000 jobs. After all, carbon taxation
poses a serious distributive problem. On which economic
agents should the tax be imposed, and whom should it
favour? As Tan has argued, letting the tax burden fall direct-
ly on consumers could prove unpopular; but if it is the big
energy firms that are made to contribute, they would most
probably have the means, given their dominant position, to
pass on the burden to their clients, especially small business-
es. Moreover, if a carbon tax is introduced without the simul-
taneous adoption of an effective redistribution policy, it
could aggravate regional imbalances in China’s develop-
ment. In fact, it is the most developed regions that are best
placed to seize the opportunities and benefit from the incen-
tives offered through such taxation, whereas the central and
western provinces, which are more dependent on heavy and
energy industries, are likely to end up paying more.
Thus China appears to be heading towards the adoption of
a carbon tax under trade threats. It is likely to be introduced
gradually, in stages stretching up to 2030. Meanwhile, many
issues need sorting out, the most crucial being the sharing
out of the tasks for reducing greenhouse gases among differ-
ent national economic actors.
• Translated by N. Jayaram











Fighting the Chongqing mafia
J o ckey ing  f o r  pos i t i on  ahead  o f  the  18 th  Par ty  Congre ss?
Analysis by François Schichan based on:  
• Luo Bing, “Anti-triad drive and the 18th Party Congress: Setting the stage for the princeling faction,“ Cheng Ming, January
2010, no. 387.
Over the space of a few months, the anti-triad fight has
emerged as a major theme on the Chinese political horizon.
The Hong Kong monthly Cheng Ming has characteristical-
ly sought to view the crackdown in the context of an inner-
Party power struggle. When he proposed the ambitious
action plan in mid-2009, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo
Xilai succeeded in imposing his agenda and policy themes
on his potential rivals (He Guoqiang, Wang Yang, and Xi
Jinping). (6) It is precisely the consequences of this insertion
6. See François Schichan, “Bo Xilai, the anti-corruption fight at Chongqing and the 18th
Party Congress of 2012,“ China Analysis, September-October 2009, no. 25.
of the anti-triad campaign into the national discussion agen-
da that the Cheng Ming article analyses. 
Many senior officials and leaders of the state and the Party
have worked in Chongqing at some point in their careers.
They include He Guoqiang, (7) Wang Yang, (8) and Bo Xilai.
By deciding to launch a frontal attack on the Chongqing tri-
ads, Bo Xilai deliberately highlighted his predecessors’ poor
record in this matter. The Cheng Ming article views his
action through the prism of the political change set to take
place in 2012. It might be noted in addition that Bo Xilai
boosted his image as a statesman capable of taking on prob-
lems afflicting society, the state, and the Party while at the
same time gaining enormously in the eyes of public opinion
through the use of communication techniques that have rev-
olutionised Chinese politics. (9) The Hong Kong publica-
tion’s analysis shows that the anti-triad fight is a serious
theme, taking precedence over the management of the
effects of the global financial crisis as the Party prepares to
induct new blood into its topmost leadership rung in 2012.
The magnitude of the shockwaves set off by Chongqing’s
anti-triad campaign is revealed by the Party Politburo’s
repeated reactions to it. The Politburo has already effective-
ly ordered an end to intra-Party conflicts on three occasions.
The last order contained a highly important provision: all
reports or criticisms of officials at the provincial or ministeri-
al level, as well as of Politburo members, including those
who have retired, would henceforth be handled directly by
the Central Committee secretariat. Cheng Ming said that
since May 2009, the secretariat has received thousands of
reports and letters denouncing senior party leaders (includ-
ing members of the Politburo and the Central Committee
and provincial governors as well as retired leaders).
The Politburo sounded its first call to order in September
2009, during the fourth plenum of the current Central
Committee’s term. According to Cheng Ming’s sources, this
injunction was clear as to the nature of the conflicts affect-
ing the Party: the Politburo underlined the obligation to
abide by the Central Committee’s directions as regards the
anti-triad strategy and prohibited public denunciation or
defamation of leaders suspected of collusion with triads.
These injunctions, issued at the highest level of the Party,
reflected the extreme tension among those jockeying for
position ahead of the 18th Party Congress. Many leaders
have something to gain – but also, and in most cases, to lose
– in the anti-triad battlefield.
Thus, according to Cheng Ming, the Politburo restrained
the Party’s propaganda chief, Liu Yunshan, (10) who wanted
to organise a national meeting to take stock of policies aimed
against triad gangs. He Guoqiang, a Politburo member and
former Chongqing Party secretary frequently accused of hav-
ing colluded with or at least tolerated triad gangs in the city,
was to have been a high-ranking invitee. This would have
allowed Liu to highlight the mediocre record of He, who
beat him to the Politburo post during the 17th Party
Congress.
But then, another Politburo member, Zhou Yongkang,
launched several attacks against former Chongqing leaders
with regard to the anti-triad fight. His speech in October
2009 to leading officials of the judiciary set off a wave of
protests within the Party: Zhou denounced the characteris-
tics common to triads in the five main provinces affected by
their activity (Guangdong, Hubei, Chongqing, Henan, and
Shanxi): presence of triad groups within the Party and state
apparatus, inside the public security department, and in pri-
vate and public enterprises; existence of an action pro-
gramme seeking to preserve triad influence inside these insti-
tutions and to protect their interests; triad activity in all sec-
tors of public and economic life; and most worryingly, the
existence of an influence and protection network within all
these institutions. This last issue raised the ire of leaders
mindful of their prospects ahead of the 18th Party Congress,
and of former leaders in the five provinces, especially
Chongqing municipality. Bo Xilai, riding on a political and
media wave in Chongqing, contented himself with watching
the blaze he had stoked and that was now consuming most
of his rivals.
Cheng Ming has noted that the number of such attacks has
caused top party leaders, including Politburo Standing com-
mittee members (Li Changchun and Li Keqiang), to
become concerned over accusations of feckless handling of
the triad menace, if not outright collusion with gangs. After
having woken up to the ineffectiveness of its earlier call to
order, the Politburo in November 2009 convened a meeting
in Beijing of the leading officials from the five provinces so
7. He Guoqiang, born in 1943, has been a member of the Party Politburo Standing
Committee since 2007 and is in charge of the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection. He is linked to the Jiang Zemin “faction.“
8. A Politburo member since 2007, Wang Yang is currently Party Secretary in Guangdong.
He headed the Party in Chongqing between 2005 and 2007 and is said to be close to
Hu Jintao.
9. Bo Xilai rejuvenated political communication by using traditional methods on a grand
scale (for instance, the well-reported anti-triad trials sometimes took on romantic over-
tones), while developing new modes of communication (such as sending 14 million
mobile phone text messages during the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic’s
founding).
10. Liu Yunshan, born in 1947, has been a member of the Party Politburo and director of the
Party Propaganda Department since 2002. He worked for two decades in Inner
Mongolia, dealing with propaganda matters. He served as deputy head of the
Propaganda Department between 1993 and 1997.
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11. The three political factions are: those close to Jiang Zemin, those around Hu Jintao, and
“princelings,“ or children of past Party elders.
12. In 2009, CNN listed Bo among people who “mattered the most in
Asia.“http://www.cnngo.com/explorations/ none/who-mattered-most-2009-regional-
978863. It was reported in People’s Daily thus: http://wz.people.com.
cn/GB/139029/10953112.html. 
13. The monthly (the title of which can be translated as “honest government outlook“), pub-
lished since 1988 in Sichuan, touts itself as an “inspiration source“ for the anti-corrup-
tion fight in China. Over the past decade, it has turned into a national-level review
backed by many top leaders, including Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou
Yongkang. With a print run of about 100,000, it mainly addresses Party and state cadres.
14. Liu Yifei teaches at the Party school in Chengdu and has written many articles on the
organisation and functioning of the Party in several specialised journals.
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as to draw their attention to Party discipline requirements.
After some months of tension, according to Cheng Ming,
most leaders appear to be seeking to calm the waters. Thus,
President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao personal-
ly set about restoring order, fearing that his leading lieu-
tenants could lose their influence and credibility in these
internal struggles. At the same time, Wang Hongju was
removed from the posts of mayor and vice-chief of the Party
in Chongqing in view of his poor showing in the anti-triad
drive, but he was not subject to disciplinary action.
Guangdong Party secretary and Politburo member Wang
Yang sent a delegation to Chongqing to promote economic
cooperation and appease local leaders by offering, according
to Cheng Ming, a 500 million yuan subsidy in order to buy
their silence. Wang wanted to avoid close scrutiny of his
record in Chongqing between 2005 and 2007. Here again,
according to Cheng Ming, Hu Jintao’s hand was discernible:
the reputation of those close to him, Wang Yang in particu-
lar, had to remain unsullied in preparation for their promo-
tion to the Standing Committee during the 18th Party
Congress.
This power struggle among three rival factions, (11) with the
anti-triad campaign as the focus, is a “remake“ of the cele-
brated Chinese classic Romance of the Three Kingdoms,
according to Cheng Ming. The main beneficiary of this
struggle appears to be Bo Xilai, who succeeded in imposing
the anti-triad theme on Party forums as much as on public
perception, greatly increasing his popularity both within and
outside China as a result. (12) In the process, however, he con-
fronted the Party apparatus and earned the wrath of the
three factions. The monthly Lianzheng Liaowang (13) has
stressed the exemplary nature of the anti-triad battle in
Chongqing. Writing in its February edition, a Party school
teacher, Liu Yifei, (14) points to lessons that can be drawn
regarding the need to strengthen the anti-corruption drive,
especially in view of popular backing for an official crack-
down. It is abundantly clear that even though the anti-triad
fight appears to be intimately linked to the anti-corruption
campaign, it has supplanted the latter in the Chinese politi-
cal agenda. The anti-triad suppression no doubt has another
objective: diverting public opinion from the highly sensitive
issue of corruption within the state and the Party, where
crackdowns have yielded far from brilliant results. Thus,
within a few months, thousands of officials and Party cadres
were arrested and tried (including the former head of
Chongqing’s judiciary and vice-chief of police, Wen Qiang).
In Cheng Ming’s analysis, the anti-triad fight has thus
emerged as a veritable campaign theme in the run-up to the
18th Party Congress. It has the double advantage of impli-
cating political leaders by focusing on their records and of
mobilising public opinion at both the local and national lev-
els. In this respect, the crackdown is an innovation in inner-
Party struggle in the context of the induction of new blood
through the 2012 meeting. Bo Xilai and, to a lesser extent,
Wang Yang (see above) have gained an especially high pro-
file through their agile political manoeuvres, which makes
them well-placed to bid for membership of the Politburo
Standing Committee or an even higher position. But the
road to 2012 is still long.•
• Translated by N. Jayaram
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